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Adam Smith, Collusion and “Right” at the
Supreme Court
David M. Levy* and Sandra J. Peart**

Adam Smith’s views on collusion were injected into the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly as Justice
Stevens puzzled over why a collusive action might be viewed
as “right.” Motivation by a desire for approbation provides
Smith’s explanation for the existence of well-functioning
groups. “Right” action is approved by the group. The question
is what happens when the groups are in conflict. For Smith,
collusion is one instance of the larger problem of faction in
which a small group organizes to exploit the larger society.
I. INTRODUCTION
Adam Smith acquired yet another fifteen minutes of fame when his
views on collusion were injected into the Supreme Court’s ruling
in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly.1 Writing for the Court, Justice Souter
footnotes the use of Smith’s argument by the dissent. Souter suggests
that Smith’s remark about the collusion of masters was “tonguein-cheek:”
the dissent playfully suggests that they conspired to restrain
trade, an inference said to be ‘buttressed by the common sense
of Adam Smith.’ If Adam Smith is peering down today, he may
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be surprised to learn that his tongue-in-cheek remark would be
authority to force his famous pinmaker to devote financial and
human capital to hire lawyers, prepare for depositions, and otherwise fend off allegations of conspiracy; all this just because he
belonged to the same trade guild as one of his competitors when
their pins carried the same price tag.2
Writing in dissent, Justice Stevens quotes the famous passage from
Smith, and suggests that in fact Smith’s judgment concerning collusion may, in this instance, be on target:
Many years ago a truly great economist perceptively observed
that ‘[p]eople of the same trade seldom meet together, even
for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a
conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise
prices.’ I am not so cynical as to accept that sentiment at face
value, but I need not do so here. Respondents’ complaint points
not only to petitioners’ numerous opportunities to meet with
each other, . . . .3
Justice Stevens then notes the famous puzzle: when a company
agrees to collude with its rivals, it faces the immediate incentive to
cheat. So the puzzle is, what’s the right thing to do:
also to Notebaert’s curious statement that encroaching on a fellow incumbent’s territory ‘might be a good way to turn a quick
dollar but that doesn’t make it right.’ What did he mean by that?
One possible (indeed plausible) inference is that he meant that
while it would be in his company’s economic self-interest to
compete with its brethren, he had agreed with his competitors
not to do so.4
Two questions follow immediately. First, did Smith’s remark reflect
a serious statement about the prevalence of collusion, i.e. is Justice
Stevens interpreting Smith correctly? Second, supposing Smith did in
fact see cooperative behavior as some sort of norm, how was cooperation (or collusion) enforced in his system? Today, economists might
answer the latter question by presuming a punishment system is in
force with repeated interactions. Expected payoffs to cheating alter
with repetition, making it no longer profitable to renege on cooperative agreements. All is handled in terms of expected monetary
Id at 1971, n 12 (internal citations omitted).
Id at 1985 (citing Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations, in R. Hutchins and M. Adler, eds, Great Books of the Western
World 55 (1952)).
4
Id at 1986 (internal citations omitted).
2
3
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rewards. “Right” actions are determined by the highest expected
payoff. We suggest that Smith thought otherwise.
Consider first cooperative behavior among the masters. Cooperation can of course be good for society. But when small groups cooperate
at the expense of large groups, a problem that greatly troubled Smith,
the outcome is a less happy one. That Smith believed the masters
were “always and everywhere” in a combination is readily apparent
in the Wealth of Nations.5 There, he considered the problem of wage
determination in various societies, supposing a group bargaining
situation with masters pitted against workmen. The combination of
masters is, he wrote, “the natural state of things:”
We rarely hear, it has been said, of the combinations of masters,
though frequently of those of workmen. But whoever imagines,
upon this account, that masters rarely combine, is as ignorant
of the world as of the subject. Masters are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform combination,
not to raise the wages of labour above their actual rate. To violate this combination is everywhere a most unpopular action,
and a sort of reproach to a master among his neighbours and
equals. We seldom, indeed, hear of this combination, because it
is the usual, and one may say, the natural state of things which
nobody ever hears of.6
The problem of small groups exploiting large ones is known as the
problem of factions. The faction of immediate concern in the chapters on wages and growth in the first book of the Wealth of Nations
are the masters.
II. “RIGHT” AS A SUPPORT FOR COLLUSION
The question that follows, is how the faction is maintained when
there may be monetary rewards to cheating? Smith’s answer was
that rewards accrue in two incommensurate dimensions, money and
approbation, and people like both money and approbation. People
interact using language. These interactions yield two sets of rewards,
money and approbation, which is carried by language. Approbation
results from following a norm of reciprocity (from not cheating on
agreed-upon actions); disapprobation results from violating it (from
cheating). Thus, the rewards to co-operation are augmented by the
approbation that results when a person follows the group norm. For
Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations
(Methuen 1904).
6
Id at i 8, §13 (emphasis added).
5
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individuals who desire both approbation and income, co-operation
satisfies what we have called “katallactic rationality.”7
This provides the solution to Justice Stevens’ puzzle. While a master might earn a bit more if he were to deviate from his agreement
with the masters, he would suffer their disapproval and be shunned
by the group to which he belongs. So, the masters who co-operate
are rewarded by the approval of their equals; their conduct would
be approved, that is, said to be “right.” Of course, when we take the
larger group into account, this “right” conduct might well be bad for
society as a whole. The problem of factions is that the cooperation of
the small group occurs at the expense of a larger group.
In Smith’s account, it is unclear whether the combination will
succeed or not. What we do know is that the masters have a considerable advantage in his view because they are fewer and richer than
the workmen.8 At the same time, combinations might not survive
growth in the demand for labor. In America, Smith finds that the
continual increase in the demand for labor makes employer collusion impossible so that the condition of the working class improves
dramatically.
This raises the obvious question. If the workers’ condition improves
but that of the masters deteriorates, is society better or worse off?
One way to decide is to count those helped and those harmed and to
appeal to the reader as impartial spectator:
Is this improvement in the circumstances of the lower ranks of
the people to be regarded as an advantage or as an inconveniency
to the society? The answer seems at first sight abundantly plain.
Servants, labourers and workmen of different kinds, make up the
far greater part of every great political society. But what improves
the circumstances of the greater part can never be regarded as an
inconveniency to the whole. No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the members are
poor and miserable. It is but equity, besides, that, they who feed,
cloath and lodge the whole body of the people, should have such
a share of the produce of their own labour as to be themselves
tolerably well fed, cloathed and lodged.9
Smith goes on to emphasize the importance of economic growth for
the well-being of the children of the poor10 and the influence of children on judgment.
Sandra J. Peart and David M. Levy, A Discipline without Sympathy: From Median
Well-Being to Mean Well-Being, 38 Can J Econ 937, 937-54 (2005).
8
Smith, Wealth of Nations at i 8, §12 (cited in note 5).
9
Id at i 8, § 35.
10
Id at i 8, § 36.
7
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III. CONCLUSION
A staple result of experimental economics is that talk supports
co-operation in social dilemma games.11 Why this is so is less clear to
modern economists. The impact of language on choice, which Smith
developed at great length, is now receiving a modicum of professional
attention.12 People, unlike dogs, trade because they have language
and a concept of “fairness.” When they select an occupation, people
are willing to trade material income for the approbation of others.
Explaining co-operation is not the end of the story for Smith, since
cooperation can produce bad results. Consequently, we need to consider to what end people are co-operating. What concerns Smith is
the possibility that people co-operate to exploit others. The approbation which supports co-operation also supports collusion.
Motivation by a desire for approbation provides Smith’s explanation for the existence of well-functioning groups. The question,
however, is what happens when the groups are in conflict? Smith’s
answer, supposing that groups constrain themselves by considerations of justice, was to side with the larger group. In this supposition
and conclusion, Smith was followed by utilitarians in the classical
period.13

11
R. Mark Isaac and James M. Walker, Communication and Free-Riding Behavior,
26 Econ Inquiry 585-608 (1988).
12
See David M. Levy, The Economic Ideas of Ordinary People (Routledge 1992);
Ariel Rubinstein, Economics and Language (Cambridge 2000); David M. Levy and
Sandra J. Peart, Sympathy and Approbation in Hume and Smith: A Solution to the
Other Rational Species Problem, 20 Econ & Phil 331, 331-49 (2004); Sandra J. Peart
and David M. Levy, The “Vanity of the Philosopher”: From Hierarchy to Equality in
Post-Classical Economics (Mich 2005).
13
See Peart and Levy, The “Vanity of the Philosopher” (cited in note 12); Peart and
Levy, 38 Can J Econ at 937-54 (cited in note 7).

